- SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
OF
THE INDEPENDENT FACT-FINDING COMMISSION
ON THE 25 OCTOBER 2004 INCIDENT
LEADING TO DEATH OF INDIVIDUALS
AT TAK BAI DISTRICT,
NARATHIWAT PROVINCE, THAILAND
December 29, 2004, 8:05 pm
SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
OF
THE INDEPENDENT FACT-FINDING COMMISSION
ON THE 25 OCTOBER 2004 INCIDENT
LEADING TO DEATH OF INDIVIDUALS
AT TAK BAI DISTRICT,
NARATHIWAT PROVINCE, THAILAND
Independent Fact-Finding Commission
on the incident leading to death of individuals
at Tak Bai District, Narathiwat Province, Thailand
17 December 2004
SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE INDEPENDENT FACT-FINDING COMMISSION
ON THE 25 OCTOBER 2004 INCIDENT
LEADING TO DEATH OF INDIVIDUALS
AT TAK BAI DISTRICT,
NARATHIWAT PROVINCE, THAILAND
Pursuant to Order No. 335/2547 of the Office of the Prime Minister, dated 2 November B.E. 2547 (2004), the Independent Fact-Finding Commission* chaired by Mr.Pichet Soontornpiphit was established to investigate the incident leading to death of individuals at Tak Bai District, Narathiwat Province. The Commission?s mandate is to investigate the circumstances so as to accomplish the following:
(1) determine whether the exercise of state authority in taking control of the situation and maintaining public order, the dispersal of demonstrators who were resisting the exercise of state authority, the custody of demonstrators and the transportation of those held in custody, including measures which resulted in subsequent injuries and deaths, were conducted in conformity with laws, regulations, principles or standards for custody and transportation of persons in such situation;
(2) determine who should bear responsibility if these actions were indeed not in conformity with the aforesaid laws, regulations, principles or standards; and
(3) submit its views on future preventive measures and on the provision of appropriate remedies to alleviate the damage caused to the families of those who died.
The Commission was originally obligated to accomplish its task within one month, but this timeframe was later extended to 45 days. Commission has followed the aforementioned Order and hereby presents its findings from the investigations and its recommendations as follows:
1. Findings
In carrying out the afore-mentioned Order, the Commission deemed it appropriate to set out 11 issues for consideration. Its findings on these specific issues are as follows:
1.1 Whether the gathering at Tak Bai Police Station, on 25 October B.E. 2547, was pre-organised
Having considered the information relating to the behavior of a certain number of demonstrators before, during and after the incident, the Commission found that the demonstration at Tak Bai Police Station was pre-organised and pre-planned by a group of people with certain ulterior motives, the demand to free six detained members of a village security guard unit being merely a pretext. However, the majority of the demonstrators were not part of the movement instigating public unrest.
1.2 Whether the demonstrators were armed
It is the Commission?s view that, since the bullet holes at the Police Station, on the trees and the recreational area in the public park indicate that the bullets came from the direction of the demonstrators, and one police officer was injured from a bullet that came from this direction, some of the demonstrators were armed but the number of weapons and the number of demonstrators who were armed were likely to be small. Had the core leaders of the demonstrators been heavily armed and had there been an intense exchange of gunfire with officers, many more officers would have been killed or injured.
1.3 Whether the measures taken by the authorities before dispersing the demonstrators at Tak Bai Police Station, were appropriate
The Commission found that the measures taken by the authorities, which included the interception of incoming groups of people to prevent them from going to Tak Bai Police Station and the conduct of five to six rounds of negotiations with religious leaders and parents of the six detained members of the village security guard unit, were appropriate. However, the Commission observed that had such groups of people been successfully intercepted to prevent them from going to Tak Bai Police Station, there would have been fewer number of demonstrators.
1.4 The justifications for and the appropriateness of the methods for dispersing the crowd gathered at Tak Bai Police Station
Having considered the factual findings, the Commission found that the authorities had reasonable grounds to believe that if they were to allow the incident to prolong, the situation would exacerbate and get out of control.
Furthermore, this could have led to heavy damage to government property as well as injuries to government officials because of the large number of demonstrators involved, some of whom came with sticks, rocks and, probably, other hidden weapons. For the officials who had been under severe stress continuously over a prolonged period of time, the decision to use force to disperse the demonstrators was considered reasonable given the necessity dictated by the prevailing situation.
However, when considering the methods used in dispersing the demonstrators including the use of arms and live ammunition and the use of army conscripts and rangers who lacked experience in dispersing demonstrators, the Commission found such methods to be inappropriate, not being in conformity with established guidelines and international practice. However since both the demonstrators and the officials suffered death and injury, it should be for the agencies tasked with the implementation of the judicial process to dispense justice for all the parties concerned. As for allegations that demonstrators were shot at close range in the head, no indication has been found from post-mortems and forensic evidence that such shootings ever took place.
1.5 Whether taking the demonstrators into custody was appropriate and lawful
The Commission found that the officials initially wanted to take into custody only some 30-40 persons who were seen as core leaders of the demonstration, and that the officials therefore prepared only four trucks, which were normally used for transporting army rangers, to transport the demonstrators taken in custody. But when the number of persons taken in custody increased due to their inability to separate core leaders from the rest of the demonstrators, the plan had to be adjusted to take into custody all the demonstrators who were to be screened and separated later. This led to several errors in the subsequent planning and implementation of the plan. It must be noted that the Fourth Army Area Commander, who exercises his authority under martial law, had the authority to take the demonstrators in custody for up to seven days.
1.6 Whether the decision to use Ingkayutthaboriharn Army Camp, Pattani Province, for holding the demonstrators taken in custody was appropriate
The Commission found that the decision to use Ingkayutthaboriharn Army Camp, Pattani Province, for holding the demonstrators taken in custody was appropriate. Because there was a large number of demonstrators and the facilities in Narathiwat Province for holding persons taken in custody were inadequate and inappropriate, it was decided to use Ingkayutthaboriharn Army Camp, Nhong Jik District, Pattani Province, which had a military detention facility to house the demonstrators and a military hospital that could provide care for those who were sick or injured.
1.7 Whether the manner in which the persons taken in custody were transported from Tak Bai Police Station, Narathiwat Province, conformed to applicable standards
The Commission found that under the prevailing circumstances, the persons taken in custody were transported to Ingkayutthaboriharn Army Camp in a hurried and disorganised manner. The number of available trucks, 26 or 28 in total (information on this remains unclear), was deemed sufficient to transport all the 1,300 persons taken in custody, with an average of 50 persons per truck. However, when the first few trucks loaded up fewer than 50 persons, the remaining trucks had to carry more than 50 persons since the officials sought to transport every single person taken into custody. Moreover, the same number of trucks had the extra burden of picking up another group of demonstrators who were intercepted at checkpoints and taken into custody at a tri-junction. This resulted in a large number of deaths in trucks at the rear end of the convoy.
The Commission found plausible the explanation that the demonstrators were initially cramped up together with one piling on top of another, particularly in the first truck of the first convoy, and that when this was first spotted by the commanding officers, orders were given to take these persons off the trucks and to rearrange their positions in the trucks in a more appropriate manner. One could therefore reasonably assume that there should ensue no further order requiring the stacking up of persons in the trucks as it was later to transpire.
However, from the post-mortems, interviews with physicians who tended to the injured, and from visits made with the injured, it could be concluded that persons in custody died because they were in a weakened condition, unable to help themselves, having been subjected to prolonged deprivation of nourishment and water as well as the lack of ventilation. The muscles used for breathing were weakened. The weight being pressed down on top of them, which was caused by overloading trucks, was a factor. Many died due to compression to their chest. Many were found with imbalances in the make-up of their blood composition with condition suggesting that their muscles were destroyed (Rhabdomyolysis) and possibly having acute renal failure, all of which are the causes of death. As a result, it is undeniable that the persons held in custody must have been piled on top of one another in the trucks at the rear of the convoy.
The Commission considers the commanding officers concerned to be badly lacking in judgment for having failed to supervise the transportation of persons in custody until its completion. These officers left the task to be performed by low-ranking personnel who were sadly inhibited by inexperience and who were focussing merely on trying to get through the job at hand, without taking into account other factors. Because of their lack of experience in handling such matter, they could hardly have been expected to anticipate the deaths that were to occur.
1.8 Whether the amount of time spent between taking the persons in custody from Tak Bai Police Station and getting them off the trucks at Ingkayutthaboriharn Army Camp, Pattani Province, was appropriate
Because Tak Bai Police Station was 150 kilometres away from Ingkayutthaboriharn Army Camp, the long convoy of trucks had to make stops along the way. It was night time and raining heavily. There were barricades on the road. Finally, there were rumours that the persons in custody might be snatched away. Owing to these circumstances, it was not possible for the trucks to travel as fast as they should have and thus the travel time of approximately five hours stood to reason under the prevailing circumstances.
As for the time spent on getting the persons in custody off the trucks at the military provincial prison, it is the Commission?s view that because the road in front of the prison was too narrow for 2 trucks to either go in or pass each other in opposite directions at the same time, unloading the persons was slow. The time spent therefore stood to reason given the circumstances.
Although the time spent on getting the persons in custody off the trucks was within reason given the circumstances, the Commission found that when deaths in one of the trucks were reported, the officers responsible did not take any action with regard to the remainder of the trucks waiting to be unloaded, nor did they notify other officers who supervised those trucks to take actions such as getting the persons in custody off the trucks immediately to minimize the casualties. Such omission, in not seeking to minimize further damage, should not have occurred and must be considered an irresponsible conduct.
1.9 Whether the person in custody have been appropriately taken care of at Ingkayutthaboriharn Army Camp, Pattani Province
The persons held in custody collaborated the statements of the officials that they were well taken care of at the military provincial prison and the hospital at Ingkayutthaboriharn Army Camp. Medical attention was also given by physicians and personnel in other hospitals in Pattani Province and the nearby provinces. The Commission therefore found that the persons in custody and the injured were effectively taken care of in an appropriate manner.
1.10 Whether there were any missing persons as a result of the incident on 25 October B.E. 2547 (2004)
It is established as a fact that there are seven persons missing. The Commission is therefore of the view that government agencies, especially local agencies speed up their investigation and keep close contact with the next of kin of those who are still missing. The former should provide remedies and give moral support to the latter to show that the authorities are not unresponsive to the incident, and that they are concerned for the well-being of the population as they have always been.
1.11 The persons responsible for dispersing the demonstrators at Tak Bai Police Station and the persons responsible at Ingkayutthaboriharn Army Camp, Pattani Province
(1) The persons responsible for dispersing the demonstrators at Tak Bai Police Station, Narathiwat Province, and for transporting those in custody to Ingkayutthaboriharn Army Camp, Pattani Province
The facts are that the Commander of the 5th Infantry Division was ordered by the Fourth Army Area Commander to supervise the troops in dispersing the demonstrators and to be responsible for all tactical operations. The Commission therefore considered that he was tasked with the responsibility for dispersing the demonstrators at Tak Bai Police Station, in which seven persons later died and several more were injured. He was also tasked with the responsibility for taking the demonstrators into custody, getting the demonstrators on the trucks and transporting them to the military detention facility at Ingkayutthaboriharn Army Camp, Pattani Province. It is now established that he was not on the scene to supervise his assigned tasks to their completion but left the scene, with no cause or justification at approximately 19.30 hrs. The Commission thus found that the Commander of the 5th Infantry Division, failed to properly discharge and perform his duty assigned to him by his commander.
(2) Responsible persons at Ingkayutthaboriharn Army Camp, Pattani Province
The Commission found that the Fourth Army Area Deputy Commander(2) who was responsible for intelligence and strategic plans, was ordered by the Fourth Army Area Commander to arrange water and food for and a site to receive the persons to be held in custody at Ingkayutthaboriharn Army Camp, Pattani Province. Despite the fact that after their arrival at the Camp, some of these persons were found dead on the trucks, no warning or order was issued to the officers in charge of the remaining trucks waiting to off-load more persons, so as to minimise the foreseeable casualties. Therefore, in the Commission?s view, the Fourth Army Area Deputy Commander(2) failed to properly discharge and perform his duty in accordance with the authority entrusted to him by his commander.
(3) Person with Overall Responsibility
Although the Fourth Army Area Commander delegated the responsibility in the aforesaid matters to the Commander of the Fifth Infantry Division, and to the Fourth Army Area Deputy Commander, he still retained the responsibility to follow up, monitor and supervise the mission entrusted to his subordinates to see whether it was successful or was being beset with difficulty. The Fourth Army Area Commander, despite being informed at 01.30 hrs. on 26 October B.E.2547 that approximately 70 persons in custody had been found dead at Ingkayutthaboriharn Army Camp, took no action until 27 October B.E. 2547 when he arrived at the Camp to give testimony to the Special Committee of the Senate investigating the death of 78 persons in custody. Therefore, the Commission is of the opinion that the Fourth Army Area Commander failed to properly perform his duty and failed in his responsibility as a commander to closely monitor and supervise the mission he entrusted to his subordinates.
(4) Lessons to be learnt from the incident
Some of the core leaders who desired to prolong the situation were the instigators of the unrest. All officials who were called upon to restore law and order had to perform their duties under many constraints which may have led to errors, large and small. However, these officials did not have the intention to cause deaths or injuries. This incident, therefore, must be studied so that recommendations could be made to prevent the re-occurrence of this type of incident.
2. Recommendations
The Commission offers the following recommendations in relation to the Tak Bai incident in Narathiwat Province and the deaths of the persons in custody at Ingkayutthaboriharn Army Camp, Nhong Jik District, Pattani Province.
2.1 Recommendations with regard to intelligence
The Government should take a proactive approach by improving the effectiveness of intelligence in the area, with emphasis on human intelligence and technical intelligence including the co-ordination in an integrated manner between Thai intelligence communities and intelligence units of friendly countries. The Government should also provide more funding to intelligence work, with the Division of Peace Promotion in the Southern Provinces serving as the responsible authority.
2.2 Recommendations for dispersal of demonstrators
(1) In order to prevent any loss of life in any future demonstration, riot police who have been trained and properly equipped to deploy in the affected area should be the main units used. Riot control military units will be deployed in a supporting role only if the number of available riot police personnel is insufficient. Such riot control military units must not be armed.
(2) Dispersal of demonstrators should be an option of the last resort to be used only if the failure so to do would incur consequences of acute gravity.
(3) Dispersal of demonstrators should be done in accordance with contingency planning and in accordance with steps taken under a carefully worked-out plan.
2.3 Recommendations for the holding of demonstrators in custody and their transfer
(1) Only the core leaders of the demonstrators and those reasonably seen to be suspects should be taken into custody.
(2) Forcible measures should not be used in taking demonstrators into custody. Their safety and well-being should be taken into account and they should receive at least the minimum standard of humane treatment.
(3) In transferring demonstrators to a detention facility, the transporting vehicles must be suitably equipped for the purpose and must be sufficient in number to transport persons in custody safely. In addition, there must be commissioned officers who are in charge of and conduct the whole process of transfer. In this regard, the Royal Thai Police is the responsible agency.
(4) If the transportation is over a long distance, the officers should ensure that persons in custody are seated upright, and should be ready to provide basic care.
(5) In case where several vehicles are used, they should travel as a closed convoy. There should be a director in charge travelling with the convoy to inspect its readiness prior to departure and to constantly monitor the transportation operation until the persons in custody are handed over safely at the destination.
(6) Personnel on guard duty should make a list which contains the names and total number of the persons under their respective custody. The record of the handing over and receiving of the persons in custody at the destination should be signed by the relevant officers.
(7) Where belongings of the persons in custody are confiscated or held as evidence, a list of such belongings should be compiled and signed by the relevant officers at every stage.
(8) In case of unexpected emergencies, the responsible officers should rely their good judgment giving due account to human dignity, well-being and safety of the persons in custody as being of paramount importance in making any decision.
2.4 Remedial measures in case of death for those who died
The Government should compensate the family of the deceased, based on the principle in the Islamic law that any death caused by negligence or misconduct of government officers where the wrongdoer(s) cannot be found must be compensated by the Government. An ad hoc committee should be established by the Government to determine the amount of compensation and find ways to prevent misconduct from recurring. The compensation or remedy for the family of the deceased must be done in such a way that should foreclose future litigation in court of law. Nor should the compensation be such that it will lead the public believe that it was being done to pander to the instigators of the unrest.
2.5 Remedial measures for the injured and sick persons
As for remedial measures for the persons injured or becoming sick as a result of the Tak Bai incident, the Government must take care of them and provide financial support for their hospitalization until they are completely cured and recovered. This right is recognized under the Thai Constitution. The Government should compensate the family of the injured and sick persons in the amount recommended by the abovementioned ad hoc committee. In addition, during the period when the injured and sick persons are recovering and cannot work, the Government must provide financial support and compensation for any lost income in order for them to support their family during the time they cannot earn their living as normal.
2.6 Remedial measures for the persons held in custody and any other persons affected by the incident
(1) Remedial measures in the case of missing persons
The Government must instruct the Governors of the three Southern border provinces to expeditiously verify and gather the information of the missing persons together with other evidence in order to clarify the matter. The authorities should announce that anyone whose family member(s) or relative(s) has/have been missing after the incident should come forward to give the relevant information to the authorities. The Provincial Islamic Commission in each province should act as a contact point in this matter, and people may also provide information to religious leaders in the area. Where there is clear evidence that there are missing persons, the authorities must examine and pursue this matter and produce the outcome as soon as possible.
(2) Remedial measures where there is a loss of property
The Government should order the responsible officers to verify, return and compensate the demonstrators for the belongings that have been seized by the officers and lost, especially in the case of mobile phones. Where an item must be used as evidence, it must be seized in accordance with legal procedures and, to create mutual understanding between the people and the officers, the officers must ensure that people understand that such seizure is accordance with the due process of law.
(3) Remedial measures for the accused
The Government should prosecute the accused in an expeditious, just and fair manner in accordance with the due process of law.
2.7 Recommendations on administrative measures to be used in the three Southern border provinces
(1) The establishment of administrative government organisations should have more civilian character by encouraging greater participation of civilian organisations in order to solve problems on the basis of compassion, understanding and ensuring peace for the people, which should have a positive effect on the situation.
(2) The administrative plan in these three Southern border provinces should be modified by dividing the plan into short-term, medium-term and long-term plans. There should be a selection of the best civil servants who understand and have the knowledge of local culture and Islamic principles to serve in the area. Their performance should be closely evaluated and extra allowances should be paid to them on an equal basis as an incentive. In addition, when a civil servant passes a performance evaluation test, he should be shortlisted for promotion, with the requirement of job seniority reduced, for example, from 5 years to 3 years.
(3) The cooperation from the people is the most important factor in solving problems because these problems cannot be overcome without the understanding and trust from the people. Therefore, political means should come before military means. Furthermore, the key ideas advocated in the speech of His Majesty the King, namely, ?reach out, understand and develop? should be pursued.
(4) Every volunteer civilian network organisation at district and village levels should be employed to support the work of government authorities. The potential and efficiency of existing organisations should be improved by coordinating with private development organisations in order to set up development projects in villages of the three Southern border provinces.
(5) Instil into the populace the consciousness of being part of ?One-Nation State? which would unite the people and help them live together peacefully amidst cultural diversity.
(6) Recommendations on public relations and sychological measures
6.1 The facts of the incident in the Southern border provinces and the government policy on the support of Islam should be publicly and continuously propagated and explained in order to build a broad front of understanding among people, the media and foreign countries. Creating understanding among the media of foreign countries is particularly important so that both sides of the news will be accurately reported to the public for the public to receive the most accurate information.
6.2 Ensure an expeditious increase in the number of programmes in the local Malay dialect to be broadcast on National Television Channel 11, with the extension of the broadcast time. Such programmes should be tailored to the demand of local audiences. The Public Relations Department shall be the competent authority in this regard.
6.3 Use medicine and public heath as proactive measures, with mobile medical teams to provide medical check-ups for local people. If there is a shortage of human resources, doctors and nurses from outside must be rotated to the area to help. The Ministry of Public Health shall be the competent authority in this regard.
6.4 Expedite, revise, improve and manage religious studies to make them true to religious principles, since the youth recruited by instigators do not have an accurate understanding of their religious principles and are therefore easily misled and deceived. Moreover, short vocational courses should be provided along with religious studies. The Ministry of Education shall be the competent authority in this regard. 6.5 New jobs should be created without delay in order to provide the youth with employment. This is to prevent them from being misled. The Ministry of Labour shall be the competent authority in this regard.
2.8 Recommendations on appropriate systems and guidelines on enforcement of the relevant law
(1) The government should enforce the law for the purpose of government administration the suit the situation at hand. In the case of Takbai incident, for example, although martial law is currently enforced in the area, non-martial law such as the Act on Public Administration in Emergency B.E. 2495 should be enforced. Such Act provides civilian authorities (the government) with civilian authority to take action in an emergency situation, as in the Plappla Chai riot in B.E. 2517 where Prime Minister Sanya Thammasak used his authority under the Act to effectively control the situation without taking military action, and this preserved Thailand's good image. Military action might lead to internal and external political problems.
(2) Stern action should be immediately and specifically taken against those who were behind the unrest. This is because perpetrating the unrest is not an ordinary crime, but one which has become a security problem. Therefore, law enforcement must use specific measures appropriate for this situation, as opposed to those for ordinary crimes; namely:-
2.1 Prosecuting those behind the unrest for every possible offence, with the gathering of evidence to be carefully carried out and specially assigned to experienced investigation experts.
2.2 Imposing social sanctions by disclosing information about the unrest for society to know so that the persons behind the unrest would fear the loss of their social status which may sometimes be a more deterring sanction than a legal sanction.
2.3 Arranging the responsible agencies to, at all times, monitor and, as far as the law permits, monitor and control the movement of those behind the unrest.
2.9 Participation in international conferences of international Islamic organisations
High-ranking representatives from government agencies and international or regional Islamic organisations should participate or act as observers in meetings of Islamic organizations in order to provide an accurate picture of the problems and facts of Thailand, so that the correct understanding among Islamic countries in general can be promoted.
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Independent Fact-Finding Commission
on the incident leading to death of individuals
at Tak Bai District, Narathiwat Province, Thailand
17 December 2004
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